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Respondent/Cross-Petitioner is incarcerated.
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS-PETITIONER
ON CERTIORARI REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

As outlined in the Brief of Respondent and Cross-Petitioner (Rspt.Br.), this
Court should affirm Ainsworth because a unanimous panel of the court of
appeals correctly concluded that the Measurable Amount Statute's seconddegree-felony designation violates the uniform operation oflaws provision. See
Rspt.Br. 12-25. As explained by the court of appeals, the Measurable Amount
Statute is unconstitutional because it subjects "unimpaired users of Schedule I
and II controlled substances ... to a greater charge for what is otherwise
[statutorily] defined to be a lesser crime." State v. Ainsworth, 2016 UT App 2,
,I16, 365 P.3d 1227.
.Alternatively, this Court should affirm the result reached by the court of
appeals for either of the following reasons: (1) the Measurable Amount Statute's

second-degree-felony designation violates state and federal due process, or (2)
the Measurable Amount Statute's prescription exemption violates Utah's uniform
operation oflaws clause. See Rspt.Br. 25-37. Additionally, this Court should
reverse the court of appeals' decision on the sentencing issue because the court of
appeals erred in concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing consecutive sentences. See Rspt.Br. 37-43.
This brief replies to the State's response to the cross-petition. See Order
dated July 20, 2016. This brief is "limited to answering any new matter set forth
in the opposing brief." Utah R. App. P. 24(c). The brief does not restate
arguments from the Brief of Respondent and Cross-Petitioner or address matters
that do not merit reply.
ARGUMENT
I.

This Court should reverse the court of appeals'
decision on the sentencing issue because the court of
appeals erred in concluding that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive
sentences.

The court of appeals correctly vacated Ainsworth's second-degree-felony
convictions and remanded for entry of third-degree felonies and resentencing.

State v. Ainsworth, 2016 UT App 2, ,r,r13-19, 22, 365 P.3d 1227. Rather than
stopping there, however, the court of appeals went on to address the trial court's
original sentencing decision and ruled that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. See id. ,r,r19-21.
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The cross-petition issue on certiorari is: "Whether the Court of Appeals
erred in concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
consecutive sentences." Order dated July 20, 2016. Ainsworth asks this Court to
reverse because the court of appeals "erred in concluding that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences" in two ways: The
court of appeals erred by making the conclusion at all, or, alternatively, the court
of appeals erred by affirming the trial court's consecutive sentencing order. See
Rspt.Br. 37-43.
In the Reply Brief of Petitioner and Brief of Cross-Respondent (Pet.Rply.),
the State argues that the question of whether the court of appeals erred by
addressing the consecutive sentencing issue is not before this Court on certiorari.
See Pet.Rply.Br. 30-31. Alternatively, the State argues that the court of appeals
correctly addressed the trial court's consecutive sentencing decision, see
Pet.Rply.Br. 31-33, and correctly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. See Pet.Rply.Br. 34-40. For the
reasons stated below and in the Brief of Respondent and Cross-Petitioner, the
State's claims fail. See Rspt.Br. 37-43.
First, the question of whether the court of appeals erred by addressing the
consecutive sentencing issue is properly before this Court on certiorari. "In
determining the scope of an order granting certiorari," this Court is "guided by
rule 49(a)(4) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." State v. Leber, 2009 UT
59, ,r10, 216 P.3d 964. Rule 49(a)(4) "states that '[o]nly the questions set forth in
3

the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme Court."'

Leber, 2009 UT 59, ,I10 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4)) (emphasis in
original). "Questions presented for review within the petition for certiorari 'will
be deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein."' Leber,
2009 UT 59, ,I10 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4)). "Furthermore, 'this rule
should be construed broadly to avoid the rigid exclusion of reviewable issues,
however peripheral."' Leber, 2009 UT 59, ,I10. But "[i]ssues not presented in the
petition for certiorari, or if presented, not included in the order granting
certiorari or fairly encompassed within such issues, are not properly before this
Court on the merits." DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,443 (Utah 1995) (emphasis
added).
Here, this Court should reach the question of whether the court of appeals
erred by addressing the consecutive sentencing issue because the issue was raised
in the cross-petition for certiorari and is fairly included within the order granting
the cross-petition.
Ainsworth raised the question of whether the court of appeals erred by
addressing the consecutive sentencing issue in the conditional cross-petition for
certiorari (Cross-Pet.). In the cross-petition, Ainsworth asked this Court to
address the court of appeals' sentencing decision based on two theories:
Whether the court of appeals erred by addressing the consecutive
sentencing issue after it had already reduced Ainsworth's convictions
and remanded with an order for resentencing or, in the alternative,
whether the court of appeals erred by holding that the trial court did
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not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Ainsworth to serve three
consecutive terms of one-to-fifteen years in prison.
Cross-Pet. 4. Regarding the first theory, Ainsworth argued that, having vacated
Ainsworth's second-degree-felony convictions and remanded for imposition of
third-degree felonies and resentencing, the court of appeals should have left the
question of whether to run the third-degree felonies consecutively to the trial
court to decide on remand. Compare Cross-Pet. 17-18; with Rspt.Br. 37-39.
This Court granted the cross-petition on the following issue: "Whether the
Court of Appeals erred in concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion
in imposing consecutive sentences." Order dated July 20, 2016. This question
fairly includes both theories presented in the cross-petition. As argued by
1..J)

Ainsworth in the Brief of Respondent and Cross Petitioner, the court of appeals
erred in concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion either
because the court of appeals should not have made the conclusion at all or, in the
alternative, because the decision the court of appeals made was incorrect. See
Rspt.Br. 37-43.
Thus, this Court should address whether it was improper for the court of
appeals to address the consecutive sentencing issue because the issue was raised
in the cross-petition for certiorari and is fairly included within the order granting
the cross-petition.
Second, it was improper for the court of appeals to address the consecutive
sentencing issue. Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure says: "If a
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judgment of conviction is reversed [in a criminal case], a new trial shall be held
unless otherwise specified by the court. If a judgment of conviction or other order
is affirmed or modified, the judgment or order affirmed or modified shall be
executed." Utah R. App. P. 3o(b); see Utah R. Crim. P. 28(a). Further, rule 30
says: "If a new trial is granted, the court may pass upon and determine all

questions of law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and necessary to
the final determination of the case." Utah R. App. P. 3o(a) (emphasis added).
The State acknowledges rule 30, but argues that it was appropriate for the
court of appeals to address the consecutive sentencing issue because rule 30
"does not preclude the Court from addressing other issues that are likely to arise
on remand for resentencing." Pet.Br. 32-33.
But the State's claim is contrary to rule 30 and case law. Resentencing is
not "a new trial," and sentencing decisions are not "questions of law." Utah R.
App. P. 3o(a). Rather, sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. See LeBeau v. State, 2014 UT 39, ,I16, 337 P.3d 254. The court of
appeals "vacate[d] Ainsworth's convictions and remand[ed] with instructions for
the district court to enter his convictions as third-degree felonies and to
resentence him accordingly." Ainsworth, 2016 UT App 2, ,r22. It is clear from the
opinion that the court of appeals intended the trial court to conduct a new
sentencing hearing. See id. ,r19 (noting that the issue of consecutive sentences is
"likely to arise on remand" because the Ainsworth decision will "require that the
district court also resentence [Ainsworth]"). Having ordered the trial court to
6

resentence Ainsworth, the court of appeals should have left the question of what
sentence to impose to the trial court on remand. See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 850
P.3d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (vacating conviction, imposing reduced conviction,
and remanding for resentencing); State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 657 (Utah 1989)
(same); State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961,965 (Utah 1987) (same), superseded by

statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 82, ,r12, 150 P.3d
532.
As pointed out by the State, "later developments regarding [Ainsworth's]

rehabilitation, conduct in prison, and programming during appeal" are not
contained "in the record" on appeal. Pet.Br. 33. Rather, those "developments" are
"new, and unknown" to the appellate courts. Pet.Br. 33. In other words,
resentencing will require the trial court to consider new information that was not
available to the court of appeals. See Rspt.Br. 39. This is why it was incorrect for
the court of appeals to address the consecutive sentencing issue. Having vacated
Ainsworth's second-degree-felony convictions and remanded for imposition of
third-degree felonies and resentencing, the court of appeals should have left the
question of whether to run the third-degree felonies consecutively to the trial
court to decide on remand. See Rspt.Br. 37-39.
Finally, the court of appeals incorrectly affirmed the trial court's
consecutive sentencing order. The State asks this Court to affirm the court of
appeals' decision affirming the sentence because the trial court stated at
sentencing that it had considered the number of victims and Ainsworth's history,
7

character, and rehabilitative needs. See Pet.Br. 34-40. The State claims that
"[t]his is all that is required by statute." Pet.Br. 35.
But it is not enough that a court says that it has considered "the gravity and
circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character,
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code §76-3-401(2) (2012); see
Pet.Br. 34-40. "[B]eing aware of' mitigating information and "taking it into
account are not the same thing." State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah
1993). Thus, when a sentencing issue is raised on appeal, the appellate court will
review the record to determine whether the trial court "may not have given
adequate weight to" mitigating information. State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930,932,
938 (Utah 1998).
In LeBeau, Galli, State v. Smith, and Strunk, for example, this Court did
not uphold the sentences simply because the sentencing judges were made aware
of mitigating information. See LeBeau, 2014 UT 39,,I,I56-67; Galli, 967 P.2d at
932,938; Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 244-45 (Utah 1995); Strunk, 846 P.2d at 130001. Instead, this Court reviewed the record and held that the sentencingjudges
abused their discretion by failing to adequately consider the mitigating
information provided to them. See LeBeau, 2014 UT 39, ,I,I56-67; Galli, 967 P.2d
at 932,938; Smith, 909 P.2d at 244-45; Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1300-01.
In LeBeau, this Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to adequately consider "several mitigating factors raised by Mr. LeBeau,"
including "strong provocation," "good employment history," "strong family ties,"
8

and "an extended period of arrest-free time prior to,, the offense. LeBeau, 2014
UT 39, ,r,ru, 56-67.
In Galli, this Court reversed because the trial court "may not have given
adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances" or to the defendant's minor
criminal history. Galli, 967 P.2d at 932,938. In Smith, this Court reversed even
though the trial court stated that it had considered the statutory factors,
including "defendant's history, character, and rehabilitation possibilities,"
because the trial court failed to adequately consider that the crimes "arose out of
one criminal episode" and that its sentence was "tantamount to a minimum
mandatory life sentence." Smith, 909 P.2d at 244-45.
And in Strunk, this Court faulted the trial court for failing to adequately
consider defendant's age, noting "that the trial court was clearly aware of
[defendant's] age," as it "was discussed" at the time of the guilty plea and at
sentencing, but did not consider it as a mitigating circumstance. Strunk, 846 P.2d
at 1300-01.
In this case, Ainsworth's claim is not that the trial court failed to consider
information that was never provided to the court. See Rspt.Br. 39-43. Rather,
Ainsworth claims that the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing because
it failed to adequately consider the mitigating information provided about his
history, character, and rehabilitative needs. See Rspt.Br. 39-43. As explained in
the Brief of Respondent and Cross-Petitioner, the offenses arose from a single act
of negligent driving. See id. Moreover, Ainsworth's deep remorse, change of heart
9

about rehabilitation, progress toward rehabilitation at the time of sentencing,
family support, emotional stability, and ability to support himself suggest that
"all three terms should be ordered to run concurrently to afford the Board of
Pardons the flexibility to adjust [Ainsworth's] prison stay to match his progress in
rehabilitation and preparation to return to society." Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1302; see
Rspt.Br. 39-43.
Thus, for the reasons stated above and in the Brief of Respondent and
Cross-Petitioner, Ainsworth asks this Court to reverse the court of appeals'
decision on the sentencing issue because the court of appeals erred in concluding
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive
sentences. See Rspt.Br. 37-43.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm Ainsworth because the court of appeals correctly
concluded that the second-degree-felony designation in the Measurable Amount
Statute violates Utah's uniform operation of laws clause. Alternatively, this Court
should affirm the result reached by the court of appeals for either of the following
reasons: (1) the Measurable Amount Statute's second-degree-felony designation
violates the federal and state due process provisions, or (2) the Measurable
Amount Statute's prescription exemption violates Utah's uniform operation of
laws clause. Additionally, this Court should reverse the court of appeals' decision
on the sentencing issue because the court of appeals erred in concluding that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences.
10
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